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THE CRISIS AND FAIR VALUES:
ECHOES OF EARLY TWENTIETH 
CENTURY DEBATES?
Abstract: The recent global financial crisis has led to extensive criti-
cism of the role of accounting and its use of fair value measurement 
in causing and spreading the crisis. This paper argues that the debate 
surrounding fair value vs. historic cost, and relevance versus reliabili-
ty, is nothing new; it was at the center of early accounting discussions 
in the AAA (especially by A.C. Littleton and W.A. Paton), the AICPA 
(especially G.O. May), and the SEC. Although prominent accounting 
scholars and practitioners in postdepression 1929 focused on the use 
of historic cost, the paper discusses the decision of the IASB/FASB to 
move reliability to a secondary characteristic in its recent conceptual 
framework. This action ignores lessons learned from a century of re-
search, teaching, and practice of accounting.
INTRODUCTION
The world is barely emerging from the most severe global 
economic downturn in living memory, a banking crisis that re-
sulted from the collapse of the U.S. housing market in 2008 that 
subsequently spread to the rest of the world. Several contribu-
tory factors have been identified, of which the most widely ac-
cepted include unprecedented low long term real interest rates 
related to the excess supply of savings from Asian exporting 
economies [Wolf, 2009]; excessively lax monetary policy [Coo-
per, 2008]; the housing bubble and associated boom in consum-
er and other forms of credit, masking problems in loan qual-
ity [Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2009]; undercapitalization of 
banks and excessive maturity mismatch [Brunnermeier, 2008]; 
an explosion of new structured instruments many of which were 
poorly understood, notably by rating agencies many of whose 
ratings now appear suspect [Gorton, 2008; Mason and Rosner, 
2007]; and weaknesses in regulation and supervision that failed 
to prevent some individual institutions taking on extremely risky 
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exposures [Brunnermeier et. al., 2009].
Given that accounting is critical for well-functioning capital 
markets, there has been extensive criticism of its role in the 
crisis. A large number of capital market participants, regulators, 
politicians, and media pundits have blamed the use of fair value 
accounting as a major cause of the crisis [Whalen, 2008; Forbes, 
2009; Katz, 2008; Johnson and Leone, 2009].1 However, the ac-
counting profession, most accounting academics, the Securities 
and Exchange Committee (SEC), and other commentators have 
consistently asserted that accounting should not be blamed 
[Badertscher et al., 2010; Barth and Landsman, 2010; Laux and 
Leuz, 2010; SEC, 2008; Turner, 2008; Veron, 2008]. Their posi-
tion has been that the function of accounting is merely to record 
events and that the stability of financial markets rests on bank 
regulation, not accounting. 
This criticism of accounting is the result of its intellectual 
trajectory in which the fair value paradigm replaced the historic 
cost paradigm [Barlev and Haddad, 2003]. Before the crisis, ex-
perts posited that fair value improved relevance and augmented 
the stewardship function of accounting numbers, reduced 
agency costs, and boosted managerial efficiency. This paper ex-
amines the role of fair value accounting in the economic crisis 
and argues that the debate of relevance (as in the usage of fair 
value) versus reliability (as it pertains to historic cost) is not new 
but reflects the discussions from the early part of the 20th cen-
tury. Referring to the works of A.C. Littleton, W.A. Paton, and 
G.O. May, this paper highlights the implications of this ongoing 
debate for accounting. Moreover, it outlines current develop-
ments in the conceptual framework of the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB)/International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) that moved reliability to a secondary character-
istic, giving more emphasis to  relevance, and indirectly, to fair 
value. Thus, the current FASB/IASB framework ignores lessons 
learned from almost a century of accounting research and prac-
tice, including those from the Great Depression of 1929. 
This paper addresses the following research question: how 
does the recent subprime crisis, and ensuing fair value vs. his-
toric cost debate, relate to similar debates in the post-depression 
1  Speaking at an SEC panel on mark-to-market accounting and the recent 
period of market turmoil, William Isaac, FDIC chairman from 1978 to 1985, ex-
claimed: “I gotta tell you that I can’t come up with any other answer than that 
the accounting system is destroying too much capital, and therefore diminishing 
bank lending capacity by some $5 trillion, It’s due to the accounting system, and I 
can’t come up with any other explanation.” See Katz [2008].
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era. Additionally, the paper examines how developments in the 
IASB/FASB conceptual framework further undermine the effi-
cacy of accounting from the perspective of the above mentioned 
debate. In doing so, the paper aims to contribute to the extant 
accounting literature, and in turn to the ongoing fair value vs. 
historic cost debate, by shedding light on an enormously similar 
turn of events almost a century ago, the reverberations of which 
are very much applicable in modern times.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The 
next section discusses the recent debate on fair value. The third 
section draws on the early cost versus value debate, and the fol-
lowing section examines the conceptual framework of the FASB/
IASB and its implications for current standard setting. The final 
section offers a discussion and conclusion. 
THE FAIR VALUE DEBATE  
Factors leading to the subprime crisis:  The burst of the credit 
bubble and the following subprime mortgage crisis have result-
ed in large-scale impairment and credit-related write-downs on 
assets held by banks in the United States and around the world.2 
A key question regarding this crisis is why credit traders and 
bank managers, who were well aware that the boom in credit 
conditions could not last forever, did not take steps to limit their 
exposure before the bubble eventually burst. Some argue that 
fair value accounting contributed to this failure to act and thus 
was a main cause of the crisis. 
Until the puncturing of the bubble in the summer of 2008, 
the extension of riskier forms of credit—subprime mortgage 
lending and securitization, leveraged lending used for financing 
private equity deals, and trading of collateralized debt obligation 
(CDO) and similar assets—occurred at a record pace. It seems 
that bankers were simply pursuing ever more daring strategies 
to continue to increase their compensation without regard to 
long-term consequences.3 These problems followed a major 
2  Milne (2009) finds that total impairments and credit-related write-downs by 
28 of the world’s largest banks, including those of the insurance company AIG, 
recorded in 2007 and 2008 accounts totalled nearly $1 trillion. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that total credit-related losses across the financial 
services industry will eventually rise to $2.2 trillion [IMF, 2009]. Some other pro-
jections (e.g., that by Nouriel Roubini) are even more pessimistic.
3  See, for example, Buttonwood [2009] and Institute of International Finance 
[2009] presenting survey results in which bankers admit the existence of compen-
sation plans that encouraged high risk taking with little regard to the long-term 
success of their investments.
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structural shift in U.S. banking policies during the 1990s. Re-
laxation and erosion of regulatory restrictions gradually allowed 
commercial banks to engage in a range of new fee-earning 
activities, such as underwriting municipal bonds, commercial 
paper, mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities; the sale of 
insurance products; discount brokering; and managing and ad-
vising open- and close-ended mutual funds [Yeager et al., 2007]. 
Banks were also able to engage in other investment banking ac-
tivities, such as proprietary trading, through Section 20 subsid-
iaries. These changes resulted from the passage of the Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999, which effectively abolished 
the separation between commercial and investment banking 
that resulted from the adoption of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 
[Gibson et al., 1999]. Subsequently, from 2002 to 2007, commer-
cial banks increasingly securitized their various loan exposures, 
packaging them into agency and private-label mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) and asset-backed securities with a correspond-
ingly rapid expansion in the use of broker-dealer balance sheets 
[Adrian and Song, 2009]. These changes both served as the basis 
for the credit bubble and set the stage for the subsequent credit 
crisis.
Fair Values and the Crisis:  The resulting shift in bank strategy 
during the 1990s toward traded credit exposures changed the 
composition of banks’ balance sheets and income shown on 
them. Consequently, the effective measurement of bank perfor-
mance—and, hence, of executive and trader compensation—re-
lied increasingly on fair value accounting. It is important to dis-
cuss the applicable requirements used under existing accounting 
standards concerning the dependence of accounting treatment 
on managerial intent. Trading securities are assets measured 
at fair value on balance sheets with changes taken to income; 
trading gains and losses, inclusive of changes in fair values for 
trading securities, are reported as trading income on the income 
statement. Importantly, according to SFAS No. 115, trading 
securities are purchased with the intent to make short-term 
profits. Available-for-sale assets (AFS) are measured at fair value 
on the balance sheet date with changes taken to comprehensive 
income (thus bypassing income). These AFSs are purchased for 
medium- to long-term investments. Impairments to AFS securi-
ties are typically taken to trading income, which are either due 
to an irreversible decline in available market values or are based 
on declines in forecasted cash flows.
To appreciate the impact fair value has on banks’ financial 
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statements, as of the first quarter of 2008, 50% of assets report-
ed in fair value changes were recognized as income [SEC, 2008]. 
It is crucial to stress these fair values did not represent realized 
cash flows but estimates of future cash flows that would be prop-
erly discounted.4 Finally, and of specific concern to many users 
of banks’ financial statements, whenever quoted market prices 
are not available, banks use fair value accounting in the context 
of “mark to model,” thus requiring valuation techniques.5 
The role of fair value in the crisis has come under fierce 
criticism, leading to calls from both sides of the Atlantic for the 
suspension of its use. Standard & Poor’s presentation at a recent 
SEC roundtable expressed the current criticism of fair value 
accounting:
We support the basic premise that fair value ...is a rele-
vant basis of accounting for financial assets and liabil-
ities. However, we recognize that accounting for assets 
and liabilities at theoretical market-price measures may 
produce results that could mask the underlying eco-
nomics for certain businesses and activities, especially 
during volatile and uncertain economic and market 
conditions.6
If reliability of information is desired, historical costs are 
more useful.7 If its relevance is desired, fair value is more useful. 
However, during the recent crisis, a great deal of criticism was 
leveled at accounting and its use of fair value in valuing invest-
ment securities. The crisis raised the discussion to an important 
debate. On one side, accounting professionals, academics, and 
4  Derivatives are also presented at fair value. If they are stand alone or part of 
fair value hedges, any gain or loss on them is to be recognized in income. Gains 
and losses on derivatives used in cash flow hedges are to be taken to equity.
5  Such calculations include the use of financial/mathematical models ground-
ed on a variety of assumptions, e.g., the Black-Scholes formula for valuing execu-
tive stock options. Whenever market values are not observable, financial models 
are employed which are referred to in Topic 820 (formally known as FAS No. 157), 
relying on Level 2 and Level 3 inputs. A study by the SEC founds that for a sample 
of 50 U.S. financial institutions, about 45% of them, measured total assets at fair 
value. Furthermore, more than 85% of the fair values of these assets were assessed 
using either Level 2 or Level 3 inputs (SEC, 2008). 
6  “Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 133 of the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: Study on Mark-To-Market Accounting,” Of-
fice of the chief accountant, SEC 2008.
7  It can be argued that historic cost accounting causes reliability concerns 
because managers can smooth income by manipulating the timing of asset sales. 
However, this type of reliability involves actual managerial actions rather than 
simple manipulation of model inputs.
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the SEC posited that the crisis was caused not by the use of fair 
value accounting but by unscrupulous managers’ actions. On the 
other side of the debate, bankers, various market players, and 
politicians blamed overleveraging first because of the increased 
use of fair value and the “death spiral” caused by declining fair 
values as the second one.8 
Overleveraging resulting from the use of fair values signi-
fies that rising asset prices, such as those of real estate, lead to 
a corresponding inflation of balance sheets. Consequently, firms 
with healthy short-term financial positions can leverage upward 
without fear of future downturns or procyclical movements in 
prices. The death spiral signifies that reductions in asset prices 
lead to circular and contagious effects across a host of related 
firms. In effect, the death spiral results when one firm’s fire sale 
results in price reductions that affect a host of entities, leading 
to a systemic decrease in prices and a deterioration of financial 
position. Once asset prices drop, other firms are forced to sell 
their remaining assets to satisfy liquidity concerns, leading to 
increased pressure on prices for other asset classes, and, by 
association, pressure on other firms holding similar securities. 
Historic cost accounting often shields firms from such a conta-
gious downward spiral. 
Recently, other accounting transactions that utilize fair 
value, such as off-balance-sheet transactions, have also been 
criticized. Although this continues to this day, such transactions 
received considerable negative publicity related to the fall of 
Enron in 2001. For example, evidence suggests that before the 
2008 crisis, banks had around US$5,000 billion of assets and li-
abilities in off-balance-sheet accounts; those by Citigroup alone 
represented about US$1.23 trillion of off-balance-sheet assets 
[Sikka, 2009].9 
From an auditing point of view, even before the crisis the 
accounting profession was aware of the difficulties and limita-
tions in auditing fair values [Martin et al., 2006]. For instance, 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the 
oversight regulator of the audit profession set up by the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002, had already noted that the expanded 
use of structured securities “put reliable auditing of financial 
8  Academic evidence so far has found contradictory evidence of a death spiral 
[Laux and Leuz, 2009; Sapra, 2009]. Nevertheless, the anecdotal evidence con-
cerning the death spiral remains constant in the view of the public and regulators. 
9  These include the “off-loading” of MBS to third parties while offering some 
guarantees and retaining some eventual ownership interest.
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reporting at risk” [Johnson, 2007]. 
Audit firms in their role as advisers were actively involved 
in a trillion dollars’ worth of securitization and off-balance-sheet 
vehicles, which could have distorted investors’ and regulators’ 
perception of the severity of the problems [Arnold, 2009]. For 
instance, Deloitte & Touche advertises that the firm has been 
involved in more than 14,000 securitizations worth trillions of 
dollars. A multitude of third parties relies on auditors to ensure 
that financial statements present a true and fair view of opera-
tions and financial condition. By certifying fair value numbers 
based on a myriad of assumptions and models, however, audi-
tors have added another level of legitimacy to statements that 
actually masked underlying risks. For instance, in 2009 and 
2008, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation put into re-
ceivership 14 and 25 banks, respectively, with total assets of 
$170 billion and $372 billion [FDIC, 2009]. Although auditors 
act as watchdogs on behalf of third parties [Kalbers and Fogarty, 
1998], auditors evidently failed to do so. Instead, audit firms 
helped their clients move toxic assets off the financial state-
ments. As a consequence of auditors’ actions or lack of them, 
financial statements may have misrepresented or failed to reflect 
various financial institutions’ leverage or risk. Acting in such 
contrasting roles as auditing and advising off-balance-sheet 
transactions for clients is paradoxical regarding the role of ac-
counting. 
A 2,200-page report submitted in 2010 to the Bankruptcy 
Court of the Southern District of New York illustrates how the 
quality of auditing could have been compromised in the period 
leading to the crisis. The court asked Anton R. Valukas, the ex-
aminer, who is also the chair of the law firm Jenner and Brock 
LLP, to investigate the demise of Lehman Brothers; Valukas 
asserted that Lehman’s financial statements were misleading. 
He criticized executives who certified the financial statements 
and their auditors, in this case Ernst & Young. A key element 
in Valukas’ assessment is Ernst &Young’s handling of Lehman’s 
structured securities and off-balance-sheet transactions: Ernst & 
Young failed to question and challenge improper or inadequate 
disclosures in the firm’s financial statements and stood silent 
rather than investigate the merits of its accounting for sale and 
repurchases (repos).10 
10  Repos are agreements by which one party transfers an asset or security to 
another party as collateral for a short‐term borrowing of cash and agrees to repay 
the cash and take back the collateral at a specific point in time.
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Repos allowed Lehman to significantly enhance its capital-
ization ratio and hide its true level of debt. Although it can be 
argued that Lehman´s collapse was unavoidable, it does appear 
that the audit function failed to sound early warning alarms of 
impeding danger to alert investors and other stakeholders. Over-
leveraged positions coupled with investments into highly risky 
and illiquid assets and off-balance-sheet transactions created 
an inevitable time bomb [Tibman, 2009]. Early warning during 
the auditing process could have allowed Lehman´s problems to 
surface earlier when the market could have better absorbed the 
firm’s problems, potentially allowing it to survive. 
Financial instruments are very difficult to value, and meth-
ods for doing so vary. Consequently, modern auditing deter-
mines values of complex financial instruments whose reported 
number depends on the specific methodology used. These meth-
odologies include making a multitude of assumptions and esti-
mates about uncertain future outcomes. The specific valuation 
technique that a client employs could be one of many acceptable 
methodologies the auditor might use to certify amounts, which 
in turn could vary by billions of dollars had a different tech-
nique been used. Such complex instruments have been primary 
factors in the collapse of a number of financial and nonfinancial 
firms, such as Barings, Enron, and Parmalat [Deakin and Kon-
zelmann, 2004; Zhang, 1995]. We have learned from the U.S. 
government-initiated bailout of long-term capital management 
that even economists who are Nobel Prize Laureates and the “fa-
thers” of structured financial instruments failed in their valua-
tion of such complex instruments [Dunbar, 2000]. If Nobel Prize 
recipients failed, assuming that auditors are better equipped to 
audit/value such instruments is quite bold [Martin et al., 2006]. 
We have possibly reached the limits of what conventional audit-
ing can do [Sikka, 2009]. Additionally, if markets were inactive, 
the use of “price” indicators would be unnecessary because 
without “markets,” trading is frozen. Consequently, cost valua-
tion/assessment could depend more on models and assumptions 
than on transacted prices (as historic cost provides). The result 
would increase the chance of reporting unreliable numbers and 
material misstatements. Bruce Wasserstein, CEO of Lazard, 
stated October 30, 2008, that accounting has become a “new 
exercise in creative fiction” in which banks have balance sheets 
congested by ‘‘sludge” assets.11 
When it comes to disclosures relating to fair value, it is still 
11  See Giannone and Davies [2008].
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unclear whether those made by financial institutions during the 
crisis were deceptive or incomplete. Nevertheless, providing 
additional disclosure does not seem to solve the problem. At its 
core is the conflict between the quantity of disclosures versus 
its quality [Bukh, 2003]. In efficient markets, disclosures can 
reduce friction and alleviate information asymmetry between 
sellers and purchasers. This is the standard response because 
stock prices are thought to “instantaneously reflect all pub-
licly available information relevant to the value of traded stocks” 
[Fama, 1970]. But not all types of information have the same 
value relevance and processing costs [Merton, 1986]. Complex 
financial products can undermine such informational efficiency. 
The 2008 crisis has well illustrated that such products exist 
with few informed participants in thinly traded markets. Thus, 
Gilson and Kraakman [1984] argue that a structured financial 
product would take more time for the market to understand as 
compared to a change in interest rates by the Federal Reserve. 
Hence the usage of fair values is problematic not only from a 
measurement point of view, but also from a disclosure perspec-
tive, given the inherent difficulty in clearly articulating positions 
and exposures. 
Given the criticisms of fair value in its alleged role in the 
crisis, Congress voted to suppress fair value accounting rules 
through the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 
claiming issues of social welfare and investor protection. More-
over, this act required the SEC to review the process by which 
the FASB promulgates accounting standards. A congressional 
hearing on the usage and implication of fair value accounting 
took place, with the objective that fair value accounting be mod-
ified, with the threat to create a bipartisan Federal Accounting 
Oversight Board to supervise accounting practices [Bougen and 
Young, 2012]. 
Under this immense political pressure, reminiscent of Con-
gress’s threat to disband the FASB over the stock option expens-
ing debacle in the early nineties, the FASB responded by issuing 
the FASB Staff Position 115-2 and 124-2, entitled “Recognition 
and Presentation of Other-Than-Temporary Impairments” which 
addresses concerns regarding undue impairments of financial 
assets in times of crises. More specifically, entities do not need 
to report losses on the income statement, if they can demon-
strate that they are able to hold the asset until such a time that 
permits price recovery. Consequently, although fair values have 
been the modus operandi for a good part of the last two de-
cades, their use was “conveniently” relaxed in times of duress.
9
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FAIR VALUE VERSUS HISTORIC COST: ECHOES OF LAST 
CENTURY DEBATES
The debate in the literature concerning the use of fair value 
versus historic cost has a long history, where the current debate 
on the subject parallels the debate for nearly a century. The rev-
enue Acts of the early part of the 20th century, particularly the 
one of 1918, led to the establishment of an income tax on corpo-
rate profits. Consequently, the historic cost concept directly re-
sulted from the desire of powerful businesses to minimize taxes 
rather than pay periodic profit on unrealized gains. During that 
era, this issue was a focal point in the accounting debate regard-
ing current value versus cost. The debate over what constitutes 
correct accounting practice fueled the creation of the U.S. Secu-
rities Exchange (SEC) in 1934 with the goal to establish struc-
tured and systematic rules for income determination. Addition-
ally, the requirement for public companies to publish financial 
statements supported by an independent accountant’s certificate 
regarding the statements’ content accuracy led some accounting 
scholars to advocate the use of accounting information that is 
verifiable and based on “objective” principles—hence, historical 
cost [see May 1943b; Reighard, 1932]. 
The historic cost concept fitted well in the regulatory envi-
ronment of that time. For example, in 1935, the SEC insisted on 
the use of historic cost so that financial statements would not 
contain “misleading disclosures” [Kripke, 1970]. In 1936, the 
American Accounting Association (AAA) under the presidency of 
Erik Kohler issued “A Tentative Statement of Accounting Prin-
ciples Affecting Corporate Reports.” Although the American Insti-
tute of Accountants (AIA) disliked this memorandum because it 
would result in the AIA’s loss of power and newly found competi-
tion on standards and principles that would affect its practitio-
ners, the SEC received it well and praised it. The publication pro-
claimed historic cost to be a fundamental accounting principle. 
Support for historic cost drew ambivalent responses from a 
variety of sources. For example, G.O. May consistently criticized 
the notion of the superiority of historic cost over fair value.12 
12  Hall of Fame inductee George O. May, with a vast academic output was 
a practitioner with the most significant effect on accounting practice. As a vice 
president of the AIA (now the AICPA) and a senior partner in Price Waterhouse 
& Co., he convinced the SEC of the need for uniform accounting standards that 
should be set by the accounting profession. He also helped promulgate through 
the Committee on Accounting Procedure early authoritative guidance on account-
ing rules and principles.
10
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Rather, he favored an optimal combination of the two. For in-
stance, he favored using the lower-of-cost-or-market method for 
inventory valuation, which was a common practice in England, 
and employing historic cost for valuing other fixed assets [May, 
1943].
May’s view on the valuation versus costing role of account-
ing offers insight on current debates related to accounting meth-
odology. He argued that in pioneer economies whose capital is 
scarce and growth is rapid, the valuation role of accounting is 
important, but in established economies whose firms are large 
and complex, valuation approaches to accounting are impracti-
cal and accounting is better suited to costing. This is seen today 
in the difficulties and the inadequacy of accounting in valuing 
high-tech start-ups. Moreover, when discussing the stewardship 
role of accounting, May observed a decline in accounting’s role 
for credit providers versus the rising role for equity providers 
(and a resultant emphasis on fair value), which continues to this 
day [May, 1945].        
In writing on the concept of business income, May dis-
cussed the various ways in which accountants, economists, 
and businesspeople determine profit. An accountant would 
not accept a “discounting of the future” methodology when 
determining income because that would entail “counting chicks 
before they are hatched” [May, 1945: p. 3]. In addition, discount 
rates and realizations are subjective and hence unverifiable. In 
his later work, May focused on the concept of income, and dis-
cussed separating core income due to operations from non-core 
components such as created surplus and price appreciation. 
In recent years, current statements on comprehensive income, 
mark-to-market accounting, and, to a lesser extent, mark-to-
model reflect some of the early views on whether price apprecia-
tion constitutes a component of income [May, 1954].
In contrast, A.C. Littleton’s early work focused on theories 
of profit [1928] and whether an income figure, or a focus on 
the balance sheet, has more significance. His early work also 
touched on the concept of risk as a determinant of profits with-
out dealing with accounting for risk. One of Littleton’s main 
arguments during 30 years of writing was for a cost-based profit 
calculation as opposed to a value-based one because value-based 
profit changes and is hard to verify [Littleton, 1928, 1935, 1958]. 
As an historic cost advocate, Littleton made an early and persua-
sive argument for cost-based accounting [Bedford and Ziegler, 
1975]. Therefore, Littleton considered the primary function of 
accounting to be record keeping and the disclosure of such re-
11
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cords but never valuation.
In contrast to A.C. Littleton’s view on profit, W.A. Paton, 
an economist by training, considered profit to be a change 
in the economic value of the business between the beginning 
and the end of the period [Paton, 1932]. Hence, Paton equated 
“cost” with “value.” As early as 1936 in his writings on valuation 
[Paton, 1936], he supported an income-based approach to valu-
ation, ignoring the cost versus value debate in regard to assets 
and liabilities. For him, earning power was key. His early work 
“Valuation of the Business Enterprise” preceded by one issue of 
The Accounting Review another famous work, Preinreich’s 1936 
article entitled “The Fair Value and Yield of Common Stock.” 
Although Littleton’s and Paton’s views on what constituted 
profit differed, their 1940 joint monograph, “An Introduction to 
Corporate Accounting Standards,” revealed their agreement on 
the role of accounting. They believed that accounting is not to 
measure cost price, replacement cost, or liquidation value but 
to measure “earnings power.”  From this perspective comes the 
position of the income statement as the most important finan-
cial statement [Paton and Littleton, 1940]. This work, reprinted 
16 times, has become a true classic of far-reaching consequence 
in shaping the world of accounting, in the United States and 
internationally. The monograph’s most important contribution is 
setting historic cost as the basis of accounting. 
Paton and Littleton’s work superseded the earlier 1936 
monograph “A Tentative Statement of Accounting Principles Af-
fecting Corporate Reports” by the AAA, which was widely criti-
cized for its lack of a basic unifying theory. Paton and Littleton 
stated in   the preface to their monograph that they set out to fill 
this void. One of the main emphases in Chapters 2 and 6 was the 
need for “verifiable and objective” information. Consequently, 
they supported historic cost because they are verifiable and ob-
jective and are based on a transaction that has occurred, unlike 
replacement cost, liquidation value, market values, and other 
valuation methods (by extension, fair values such as those in 
use today). In opposition to the latter, they rejected the concept 
of appreciation because it provides no claims to meet creditors, 
suppliers, and customers. Their final argument in support of his-
toric cost rested on the concept of accountability: historic cost 
provides easily verifiable numbers that form the basis of sound 
accountability. Their only exception to the use of historic cost 
was for reorganization when assets are reassessed and revalued 
according to prevailing price conditions. This principle contin-
ues today in business mergers and acquisitions. 
12
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Some might argue that Littleton’s stance on cost versus 
value as outlined in “An Introduction to Corporate Accounting 
Standards” might have prevailed. The monograph’s approval of 
historic cost, which was then more widely accepted in practice, 
led it to become the basic paradigm in accounting education 
and practice, for much of the 20th century. However, in their 
final chapter, entitled “Interpretation,” the authors, chiefly Pa-
ton, objectively discussed the advantages and disadvantages of 
replacement cost accounting and “common dollar” accounting. 
As to the latter, they stated, “At the most what is needed is a 
special report supplementing the usual periodic statements and 
designed to trace the main effects of general price movements 
upon the affairs of the enterprise” [1940, p. 141]. Although this 
was a bold proposal for that time [Zeff, 2007], the monograph 
was widely received and has enjoyed an enduring legacy. 
Most importantly, Paton and Littleton’s work came at a 
time when pressure from the federal government on private ac-
counting bodies, to establish formal accounting guidelines, had 
reached a pinnacle. Hence, practitioners and academics alike 
quickly accepted the use of historic cost because it provided 
a “lowest common denominator” solution. The bankruptcy in 
the early 1930s of Kreuger and Toll (i.e., Swedish Match), a 
multibillion-dollar entity with 400 subsidiaries, no doubt was 
fresh in people’s minds. Kreuger and Toll had kept few financial 
records and freely used derivatives and other fair value-based 
transactions, creating a gigantic fraud [Flesher and Flesher, 
1986]. While the United States was still reeling from the scan-
dals related to Kreuger and newly created derivatives schemes 
and fluctuating prices, historic cost provided a simple solution 
in the postdepression regulatory environment.    
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the SEC to 
restore investor confidence in the stock market after its 1929 
crash, which had been accompanied by financial manipulations, 
especially the creative use of asset write-ups that were used to 
inflate income. The SEC was also influential in making historic 
cost a key in U.S. accounting standards, and it eventually dictat-
ed accounting rules for the larger part of the 20th century [Zeff, 
2007]. Robert Healy, one of the founding members of the SEC, 
abhorred the creation of unrealized gains, many of which were 
accompanied by dividend payments and had wreaked havoc 
during the 1929 market crash.13 Healy’s strong view asserting 
13  Healy was the director of the Federal Trade Commission’s and U.S. Con-
gress sponsored investigation into fraud in accounting in the years leading to the 
13
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“the purpose of accounting is to account—not to present opin-
ions of value” [Healy, 1938] dominated the SEC’s intellectual 
trajectory in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Although it is difficult to isolate the effect of the SEC from 
that of the work of the AAA, the AAA proclaimed in its 1936 
statement, “If values other than unamortized [historical] costs 
are to be quoted they should be expressed in financial state-
ments only as collateral notations for informative purposes” 
[AAA, 1936, p. 189]. Hence, the stance by Healy and the SEC 
on historic cost became rooted in accounting standards of the 
1930s and early 1940s, and was a direct consequence of the 
crash and ensuing great depression. 
This firm move toward historic cost was supported by both 
the SEC and the FTC, both of which opposed arbitrary asset 
markups, and was also supported by the executive committee 
of the AAA, and where Paton and Littleton (1940) provided a 
conceptual rationale for its wide usage. Ten years after the great 
depression, the practice of upward revaluation of assets had 
fully disappeared from U.S. based financial reporting entities 
[Swieringa, 2011]. Future generations of SEC members would 
accept only historic cost approaches in determining value [Zeff, 
2007]. Until the inflationary periods of the 1970s, the SEC rarely 
accepted departures from historic cost accounting. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE IASB/FASB FRAMEWORK 
POSTCRISIS
The preceding discussion clearly shows that the early fair 
value versus historic cost debates resulted in favor of historic 
cost. The two primary reasons for its acceptance were the post-
depression era need for reliability and the belief that opinions 
on value should not be offered held by accountants and accept-
ed by the SEC and accounting practice. As noted, this decision 
affecting the accounting profession has lasted almost a century 
but has recently been challenged by the acceptance of fair value 
accounting, especially in the FASB/IASB conceptual framework. 
After a joint meeting on September 18, 2002, the IASB 
and the FASB issued a joint Memorandum of Understanding, 
commonly known as the Norwalk Agreement. It officially and 
explicitly expressed the interest of both standard setters to move 
toward full convergence and cooperation on joint projects to 
achieve the goal of developing a single set of high-quality in-
crash and great depression.  
14
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ternational accounting standards by 2011 [FASB, 2002].  When 
finalized, this framework is to be composed of seven statements 
regarding financial accounting concepts and will supersede the 
FASB concept statements of 1978–2000 and the 1989 Frame-
work for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial State-
ments by the International Accounting Standards Committee, 
the IASB’s predecessor. 
Since beginning work in 2002, the IASB and the FASB have 
experienced several obstacles in developing this joint conceptual 
framework that have slowed their progress.  Global standards 
indicate acceptance of fair value, which the international fi-
nancial reporting standards (IFRS) advocate instead of historic 
cost, on which U.S. generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) are based. The FASB’s conceptual framework, outlined 
in Concept Statements Nos. 1–7 dating from the 1970s, has 
been criticized by both academics and practitioners [Henry and 
Holzmann, 2012; Shanklin et al., 2011]. Similarly, the IASB’s 
conceptual document, Framework for the Preparation and Pre-
sentation of Financial Statements dating from the late 1980s, 
has also received its share of criticism because of its limitations 
and brevity [Kaminski and Carpenter, 2011]. 
While some progress has been made, the project has not 
been completed because of these obstacles. The first progress 
report that served as a road map for the complete plan was is-
sued in 2006 and the second in 2008, during the height of the 
financial crisis. In 2006, the FASB issued a document outlining 
new changes to the joint IASB/FASB conceptual framework. 
Recognizing this document’s significance, the AAA Financial 
Accounting Standards Committee published a critical analysis 
of it. The committee argued that if the proposed changes were 
to be adopted, they “will serve to move accounting increasingly 
toward an approach that emphasizes the balance sheet rather 
than the income statement, emphasizes investment in corporate 
equities, and de-emphasizes the stewardship role of accounting” 
[Benston et al., 2007, p. 229]. 
The issue of historic cost versus fair value continues to be 
the focus of debates, particularly after the 2008 economic crisis, 
which began only a few years after the convergence project did. 
After the crisis, some have argued that U.S. standard setters 
should reconsider the move toward convergence, in essence a 
move toward fair value. 
Phase A of the joint conceptual framework, which is in 
the public domain, describes the “qualitative characteristics of 
accounting information.” As such, accounting should present 
15
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“decision useful” financial reporting information. Hence, to 
be useful, it should possess two fundamental qualitative char-
acteristics: relevance and faithful representation. For the first 
time, the term reliability, which was present in both the previ-
ous FASB and IASB concept statements, was dropped from the 
document.14 
Dropping reliability, which includes substance over form, 
neutrality, and completeness, from the joint conceptual frame-
work makes faithful representation a secondary fundamental 
qualitative characteristic.15 Faithful representation is the depic-
tion of phenomena in a manner that is complete, neutral, and 
free from material error [IASB, 2008]. This change of language 
eradicates the possibility that trade-offs between relevance and 
reliability might be considered whereas in the past, arguments 
against the use of fair value were from the perspective that they 
are not “reliable.” Moreover, both conservatism and prudence are 
eliminated as desirable characteristics of financial report (since 
they conflict with neutrality). Reliability is replaced by faithful 
representation with the stated reason being that it is not possi-
ble to explain “reliable.”
As it stands, Geoffrey Whittington, a former member of the 
IASB, argues that: 
The proposed sequence will involve selecting an ac-
counting method first on the basis of highest relevance 
and then subjecting this selection to a filter based on 
some absolute minimum level of representational faith-
fulness. Above this threshold there will be no question 
of saying that greater representational faithfulness 
might compensate for less relevance, even if the latter 
loss is very small” [Whittington, 2008, p. 146]. 
While Henry and Holzmann [2011], describe the turn of events:
Yet arguably, the changes in the framework have sig-
nificance beyond what might be widely understood and 
may represent a final shot in a battle between fair value 
and historical cost (p. 94). 
14  Reliability is defined as “information has the quality of reliability when it is 
free from material error and bias and can be depended upon by users to represent 
faithfully that which it purports to represent ” [IASC, 1989, par. 31].
15  It is to be noted that in the FASB’s SFAC No. 2, reliability is composed 
of three components: representational faithfulness, verifiability, and neutrality. 
Representational faithfulness is in turn composed of completeness and freedom 
from bias (FASB, 1980). Hence, in the current framework, the value criteria are 
reversed: representational faithfulness is elevated while reliability is demoted. 
16
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The conceptual framework issued jointly by the FASB/IASB 
includes many other differences with the original FASB 1978–
2000 concept statements (and earlier accounting concepts). Also 
importantly, the term as a result of past events was deleted in 
the joint framework for being redundant. However, this change 
of language signifies an important departure in the structure of 
accounting and financial statements. If economic outcomes no 
longer need to belong to past transactions, this could enable, 
for example, the recognition of fair value of internally gener-
ated goodwill: patents, human capital, customer and supplier 
relationships, and so on. Moreover, the FASB/IASB conceptual 
framework states, “The usefulness of financial information is 
enhanced if it is comparable, verifiable, timely, and understand-
able.” [IASB/FASB conceptual framework, 2010: A33; emphasis 
added]. 
Another change affects verifiability, which the new frame-
work describes only as an “enhancing” qualitative characteristic 
in significant contrast to earlier accounting principles. For ex-
ample, Chapters 2 and 6 of “A Tentative Statement of Account-
ing Principles Affecting Corporate Reports” [AAA, 1936] stressed 
the need for “verifiable and objective” information, supporting 
the use of historic cost because they are verifiable and objective. 
The current inclusion of verifiability also has resulted in crit-
icism. For example, Andrew Lennard (of the UK’s Accounting 
Standards Board), writes that “Verifiability also seems to be an 
inadequate substitute for reliability: it requires merely that dif-
ferent observers will reach consensus, and not that they either 
base their views on reliable evidence or that the method used for 
‘indirect verification’ should be” [2007, p. 53].
Finally, another change of note in the latest version of the 
conceptual framework, is the change in the primary definition of 
“users” of financial statements. Where in the prior framework, 
users had been defined as “present and potential investors, em-
ployees, lenders, suppliers and other trade creditors, customers, 
governments and their agencies and the public” (IASC, 1989, 
paragraph 9), the 2010 framework defines users as “existing 
and potential investors, lenders and other creditors” (FASB/
IASB, 2010, paragraph OB2). This change in definition, which 
is non-trivial in nature, further cements the role of fair value in 
the financial reporting process: capital providers emphasize the 
return on their capital, as measured through market prices, as 
the main benchmark in providing the above-mentioned capital.  
These changes in the conceptual framework notwithstand-
ing, to date, the goal of full convergence by incorporating IFRS 
17
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into U.S. GAAP has yet to be fully realized [Zeff, 2007]. The 
process can be described as being at a standstill, with numerous 
commentators describing the process as dead, and some arguing 
for a U-turn [see Selling, 2013].
DISCUSSION: THE WAY FORWARD
The issue of the use of historic cost versus fair value has 
generated intense debate, dominating the media in unprec-
edented ways. At the heart of the debate is the position whether 
only one accounting system reporting performance and financial 
position can exist. The use of multiple systems for various objec-
tives—whether contracting, control, or performance measure-
ment—is admittedly, problematic [see Belkaoui, 2004; Burchell 
et al., 1980]. Furthermore, reported financial numbers have 
far-reaching effects, including social welfare [Solomons, 1991]. 
If the purpose of accounting is to stimulate growth [Biddle and 
Hilary, 2006; Plantin et al., 2008], then fair value promotes ef-
ficient investment.16 If the desired outcome is to avoid steep 
economic declines, such as one allegedly induced by the “death 
spiral,” historic cost is preferred [see Magnan and Markarian, 
2011; Sapra, 2009]. Because the current economic outlook 
prefers the avoidance of steep declines at the expense of speedy 
growth, acceptance of historic cost could be the way to move 
forward. Furthermore, fair value is more open to manipulation 
to meet managerial incentives in reported financial outcomes, as 
compared to historic cost [Laux and Leuz, 2010]. Consequently, 
if the objective is to combat the managerial self-interest and zeal 
that contributed to the most recent financial crisis, perhaps the 
use of historic cost should be accepted. 
Although there are opposing points of view regarding his-
toric cost versus fair value, the strength of the arguments de-
pends on accounting’s objective. None of the arguments seems 
to be ex ante superior but depends on whether we choose in-
vestment efficiency versus loss aversion or reliability versus rel-
evance. In terms of reliability, accounting did a poor job in mea-
suring asset values and violated the convention of conservatism 
because managers appear to have used fair value accounting to 
inflate numbers from their myriad of assumptions and inputs 
[Hildyard, 2008, p. 30].17 Additionally, in the recent economic 
16  Fair value is useful for firm valuation, which is an objective of GAAP. Proper 
valuation, in turn, enhances efficient investment allocation 
17  See Magnan (2009) and Magnan and Thornton (2010) for a review of 
empirical evidence on this issue.
18
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downturn, politicians called for the suspension of fair value ac-
counting because of allegations of its cause of a death spiral. 
Because having different accounting systems for different 
macroeconomic conditions is not possible and switching back 
and forth between systems is not desirable, the only solution 
appears to be to revert to the use of historic cost. If the use of 
fair value is an important element in firms’ contracting/invest-
ing environment, these values can be disclosed in the footnotes 
and in supplemental voluntary disclosures in which the market 
would find information for valuing the efficacy of fair values and 
decide on its usefulness. Such remedies echo old debates with 
respect to the use of historic cost or fair value as highlighted in 
the work of Paton and Littleton who stated that “common dollar 
accounting” [1940] needs to be relegated to supplementary dis-
closures where the information is available for all users. 
However, other intermediary solutions could also be pos-
sible. For example, for Level 1 assets that are fairly liquid and 
have fewer reliability issues, fair value can be obtained from 
current market.18 The use of fair value is possible and even de-
sirable provided that proper disclosures explain positions and 
the extent of exposure. However, because of the reliability argu-
ment for Level 2 and Level 3 assets, only historic cost could be 
desirable.19 
Nevertheless, using mixed measurement models have long 
found opposition from intellectual purists [see Power, 2010]. 
He argues that fair value accounting changes a transaction-
based measurement system to an economic valuation system. 
However, valuation is a purpose that is beyond the scope of 
financial reporting, as per prior conceptual frameworks [FASB 
1978, para. 41]. The use of historic cost is not per se detrimental 
to measuring and assessing a firm’s performance. For example, 
recording short-term assets at historic cost would be desirable 
because the quick trading horizons of these assets would con-
tinuously appear on the income statement. For intermediate 
to long-horizon assets, historic cost would also be desirable 
18  In their discussion regarding the efficiency/efficacy of using fair values 
in financial reporting, Kothari et al. [2010, p. 14] observe, “Use of fair values in 
circumstances where these are based on observable prices in liquid secondary 
markets is consistent with economic GAAP.”
19  On this point, Kothari et al. [2010, p. 92] observe, “In the absence of 
verifiable market prices, fair values depend on managerial judgments and are 
subject to opportunism. Accordingly, we caution against expanding fair-value 
measurements to balance sheet items for which liquid secondary markets do not 
exist.”
19
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because fair value fluctuations are not significant given that they 
are held for the long term.
Regarding specific remedies concerning the usage of fair 
values, many come to mind. Although described as decision 
useful and value relevant, fair values fail in both respects be-
cause structured products have long been a ‘‘powerful tool for 
inflating company profits by hiding losses and hence the risks of 
company operations” [Hildyard, 2008, p. 30]. Numerous works 
cite the benefits of securitizations when it comes to reducing 
risk and obtaining favorable financing terms [Barth and Taylor, 
2010; Dechow et al., 2010]. However, caution is warranted when 
securitization is used to hide liabilities or bad assets. As such, 
all securitizations for which the issuer retains control or guar-
antees the transferred assets/liabilities must be accounted for 
“on balance sheet.” Citibank lost $14 billion when it guaranteed 
off-balance-sheet assets during the economic crisis. At the time, 
it was unknown that Citi held more than $1 trillion worth of off-
balance-sheet securities [Sikka, 2009]. This “on balance sheet” 
approach, would be consistent with the recent IASB/FASB pro-
posal regarding lease contracts [IASB/FASB, 2010]. 
In various aspects, financial reporting experienced a num-
ber of shortcomings during the most recent economic crisis. 
From a disclosure perspective, it provided a lack of information 
about firm riskiness. Although extensive disclosures have been 
made, important assumptions were reported under “key sources 
of estimation uncertainty.” Such disclosures were made in boil-
erplate responses that are inadequate for informing investment 
decisions [Schwarcz, 2008; Sikka, 2009]. Nevertheless, informa-
tive disclosures that are material to decision making can be ad-
equately provided to the capital markets despite banks’ annual 
reports that have hundreds of pages regarding the complexity 
of numerous structured positions held. Preparing appropriate 
disclosures about key judgments is a challenge. Because many 
assumptions and a multitude of techniques are used in arriving 
at numbers, material disclosures need to be concise and clear. 
Firms must find appropriate ways to disclose in their financial 
reporting such data in a succinct manner that provides a com-
plete picture of their businesses. 
Although some assert that accounting simply documents 
vanishing values and disappearing fortunes, numerous discus-
sions repudiate this notion. It is true that accounting docu-
ments transactions and assesses valuations. If market values 
are volatile, accounting valuations will reflect that. However, 
this conflicts with much of the accounting research literature 
20
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consistently showing that accounting has both constitutive and 
reflective powers—that it creates a reality as well as reflecting it 
[see Hopwood, 1987].20 When assets are being marked to model, 
fair value accounting creates a specific reality. Thus, account-
ing is moving beyond its traditional role of recording economic 
events and transactions so that financial statements can reflect a 
firm’s underlying economic performance. fair values are an ap-
proximate market value at best and fully irrelevant at worst and 
did not exist until accounting regulations allowed and required 
it [Woods et al., 2009]. Nevertheless, given the current trajectory 
of political-economic thought, historic cost is demoted to being 
a minor blip in the longer realm of human history [Georgiou 
and Jack, 2011]. 
The last decade has witnessed the most extensive overhaul 
of public accounting since the original securities Acts of 1933 
and 1934 were passed. The regulations emanating from the new 
legislation were intended to restore public trust and to avoid 
sudden corporate meltdowns, primarily by enacting improve-
ments to the audit and disclosure processes and to corporate 
internal controls. This has led to a major overhaul of the funda-
mental principles that govern accounting practices and began 
the transition of U.S. GAAP from a rules-based system to a 
principles-based one [Benston et al., 2007]. 
The scandals of the past decade had the expected culprits: 
managerial greed, sky-high expectations, “funny” accounting, 
lax auditing, and cheerleading capital markets. Lessons learned 
from scandals past remain relevant today: human nature is 
fallible, and greed is the cardinal sin of executives of modern 
corporations. Followers of the 2008 economic crisis recognized 
that many of factors that led to the prior accounting scandals 
still exist today, and the regulations implemented to fight these 
mistakes did not lead to desired outcomes. 
Many have blamed accounting principles that are cited as 
enabling transaction structuring in which clever accountants 
followed the rule of law but violated the spirit of GAAP. Joe 
Berardino, Arthur Andersen’s CEO, claimed that “everyone fol-
lowed the rules…..”.21  Harvey Pitt, then the chairman of the 
SEC, politicians, and media commentators led the charge to 
abolish rules-based accounting because “following technical pre-
scriptions is neither sufficient nor the objective” [SEC, 2002]. 
20  See Macintosh et al. [2000] for further elaboration on this perspective.
21  Interview on Public Broadcasting Station (PBS), with FRONTLINE 
correspondent Hedrick Smith, on May 1, 2002.
21
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Numerous materials have linked financial performance to 
human instinct and behavior [Schumpeter, 1942; Simon, 1960]. 
Behavioral phenomena such as following the herd, overconfi-
dence, illusions of control, and irrational selectivity of infor-
mation are commonly identified with the advent of behavioral 
finance [Fromlet, 2001]. Akerlof and Shiller [2009] argue that we 
will not understand economic phenomena unless we understand 
humans´ thoughts, ideas, and feelings. These authors contend 
that although humans rationally pursue economic interests, 
they are also irrational and misguided. 
In reaction to the scandals that preceded the Great Depres-
sion beginning in 1929 in the United States, powerful players 
in academia, practice, and politics embraced the use of historic 
cost. During the development of modern accounting, academics 
including W.A. Paton and A.C. Littleton, practitioners such as 
George O. May, and the SEC influenced the use of historic cost 
as the acceptable accounting method for valuing resources. This 
paper has reviewed decisions on the use of historic cost versus 
fair value and questioned the preference of the FASB and IASB 
of fair value in their conceptual framework, thus ignoring past 
debates on the subject that led to the acceptance of historic cost 
and the use the term representational faithfulness rather than 
reliability in that framework now. 
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